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**Organization of Joint Forces: Componentry Doctrine
for the Operational Commander**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy

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Abstract of

ORGANIZATION OF JOINT FORCES: COMPONENTY DOCTRINE
FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

The modern battlefield is a very dynamic, lethal, and complex environment. Because of this, an operational joint force organization must be inherently flexible, able not only to adapt in such an environment but also effectively employ the full range of its capabilities as required by the situation. A joint force commander, to achieve success, must be able to adequately organize and employ his forces to that end and should be able to draw guidance from joint doctrine in this area. Such doctrine is deficient in depth and breadth. In the absence of such guidance, joint force commanders, Services, CINCs, and force trainers have adopted a localized, *ad hoc* approach to training and organizing. The author recommends a single joint publication that comprehensively addresses joint force organization via componenty.

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Organization of Joint Forces: Component Doctrine for the Operational Commander

Introduction

Today's operational environment is complex, fluid, rapidly changing and wedded, for good or bad, to an increasing dependence on technological innovations involving information, communications, space, mobility and firepower. A major challenge for the operational commander is the efficient and effective use of the forces and resources at his disposal. In organizing his capabilities, he either presents himself with a tailored, integrated and flexible combat team or saddles himself with an inflexible, disjointed and ineffective collection of disparate units.

How does the operational commander arrive at a decision on the organization of his forces in the face of this lethal and complex environment? To what resource does he look to get the guidance, examples and general principles that can be applied to the force allocated him by the CINC?

There are three primary sources I will elaborate on in this paper: personal experience, outside recommendations and guidance, and institutionally recognized and promulgated doctrine. Of these, doctrine should be the clearest and most comprehensive, arising as it does from a development process incorporating the combined contributions of the U.S. military establishment. Unfortunately, joint doctrine is very incomplete when it comes to force organization. Prospective Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) have to rely on the other two sources to help them in organizing their force to best meet the needs of the situation they have been tasked to resolve. I will discuss this deficiency, addressing viewpoints expressed by selected Services, regional CINCs, various supporting commands and joint doctrinal publications, and close with my recommended solution - a new joint doctrine publication comprehensively addressing the subject of componentcy.

The Playing Field

"No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."^m

So states Clausewitz in discussing war planning. Clausewitz was specifically referring to political purpose and operational objective, but I think the statement is also valid in discussing all aspects the operational commander must attend to in planning for war. Unlike Clausewitz in his time, we have to be concerned with the employment of extremely complex and lethal joint and combined forces in an environment that is highly fluid and fast-paced. The commander who fails to take into account *how* his forces are organized does so unadvisedly and at great risk of making the difficult task of warfare that much harder. Previously, the battlefield could be fairly well divided into maritime and land mediums. True, one was used to transition to the other and they certainly relied on each other in the sustainment of forces but it is a modern condition that has them so intimately linked together in the actual conduct of combat operations. With the advent of air and space warfare, the rise of the aircraft carrier, submarine, and precision guided munitions delivered from a variety of platforms; multidimensional, multispectral and transmedium warfare has become the norm. Forces arrive via land, air, and sea; fires are delivered from ground, maritime, aerial and space based platforms; information is derived from any number of sources through an infinite variety of means; and the battle easily flows throughout the various mediums. How the Operational Commander organizes his forces for combat at the outset can well determine how easily he is able to adjust to a rapidly changing and increasingly complex battlefield, and how effective his forces will be against the opposition, whether it is symmetric or asymmetric. In fact, the likelihood of an asymmetrical threat increases in direct proportion to our technological

advances relative to our potential rivals. This makes even more important the proper organization of joint forces to maximize tactical and operational flexibility.

Componency in Doctrine

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, categorically states that, "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team"² and that "Joint warfare is team warfare."³ Amplifying on this, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), provides a framework for the organization of joint commands. JFCs are given the authority to "organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission"⁴ The force commander has authority to use both Service and functional components within a joint force organization. Service components are always used to fulfill the requirements of Service-unique training, administrative, and logistical support for forces provided to the JFC. If he so desires, the JFC can actually conduct operations using Service component commanders. Some of the advantages inherent in operating with Service components are: continuity of command relationships in peace and war, clear lines of communication and support from parent Services, the maximization of core Service capabilities uncomplicated by merging with other Services, and simplicity of mission assignment and operational tasking. The JFC can also opt to organize along functional lines; appropriate when forces from different Services are to be used in a common operating dimension or medium. The most common examples of functional components (as commands) are the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC). In practice, a combination of Service and functional componency is most likely to be employed.

When a Joint Force Commander receives a mission and is given forces to accomplish it, one of his first concerns is the organization of his force. He has several resources to refer to in this matter. First, will be any guidance provided by the Combatant Commander. Second, will be his own personal experience, modified by the existing conditions or situation. Third, will be the guidance provided in doctrine. In this instance, joint doctrine is crucial because it resolves the contradictions and potential problems inherent in bringing together forces from different Services. Air Force and Naval aviation components have different sets of Service doctrine as does the Army and Marine Corps when it comes to land warfare. When employing joint forces, joint doctrine provides a common language and "play book" everyone can refer to and operate with. Joint doctrine also provides the JFC with a starting point if he is lacking in practical experience in organizing and employing joint forces. It should be noted that while authoritative in nature, especially when reconciling differing Service doctrines, joint doctrine is not prescriptive; that is, it does not restrict the JFC in the organization and employment of forces as the conditions, and his best judgment, warrant.⁵

The JFC is specifically charged with the responsibility to accomplish the assigned mission and is given the freedom to organize his forces in whatever manner he feels best to do just that. That being said, it is still the job of joint doctrine to provide the commander with a set of tools he can use to go about his job. Where the "tool box" is lacking, the commander must improvise with his own wit and wisdom, the experience brought about by training, and the recommendations and guidance from seniors and subordinates. Herein lies the problem with componency. While Joint

Pubs do define it, they do little to expand on the related concepts in a manner useful to the commander. It naturally follows that if the JFC is lacking in joint doctrinal guidance, so too are the force providers who are tasked with training the forces they provide, and the personnel who will assume staff and subordinate command positions. Lacking a unified approach, each Service and training agency has had to rely on self-developed training standards and criteria that will, by their very nature, differ from each other - thus bringing together forces and commanders who have different perceptions of their roles, responsibilities and operational considerations.

Componency and the Joint Perspective

Before moving on to how the Services, corresponding doctrinal commands and selected CINCs have approached this matter, it would be best to review the extent to which componency is addressed in joint doctrinal literature. Componency is divided into two forms: Service and functional. Joint Pub 1-02 defines a Service Component Command as, "A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations under the command that have been assigned to the unified command."⁶ The senior officer within the Service Component (meeting certain criteria) is normally designated the Service Component Commander. He is responsible to the JFC for the following:

- Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the Service's forces,
- Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned,
- Conducting joint training, and
- Conducting such Service specific actions regarding administrative, discipline, training and logistical matters as are Service-unique⁷

Likewise, the Functional Component Command definition reads, "A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Services which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time."⁸ The functional component commander is normally the Service

component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked in carrying out the prescribed function; however, other considerations such as mission, force capabilities, and command and control capabilities can alter this. The functional component commander is responsible to the JFC for making recommendations on the proper employment of military capabilities made available to him in the accomplishment of his assigned mission.⁹

Joint Pub 0-2 does provide some amplification concerning the appropriateness of either functional or Service component. Functional components are said to be appropriate when different Service forces are to operate in the same dimension or medium in conducting a mission. Service components are advisable when "...stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations [dictating organizational integrity]..." are of increased importance in conducting operations.¹⁰ Joint Pubs 1 and 3-0 also address the above points using relatively similar wording. Each of the above pubs indicates that most often, JFCs will employ a combination of Service and functional components when organizing their force. Joint Pub 3-0 is relatively explicit in stating that special operations forces will be organized as a functional component and each of the pubs indicates that a JFACC will usually be employed.

Componenty - Outside the Box

As alluded to above, the potential does exist for functional components other than those already described. As defined, the operational commander can organize a functional component to address a specific function or type of operation, when the JFC has to concentrate his attention on the larger battle, or when he lacks the required expertise to adequately address the specific area or function in question. A better approach would be to expand this scope to include the use or

employment of forces in ways not currently used and with principles just now being addressed. In their article "Leaving the Technocratic Tunnel", Anderson and Pierce bring forth the idea of a littoral component commander.

"The current wisdom is that an MEF ashore in sustained operations should be a GCC asset. Littoral componency argues that Navy-Marine contributions should be power projection forces with their own zones which include land-based Marines and the sea space required to support them in areas of responsibility belonging to CINCs or JTF commanders... The littoral component commander battlespace is truly three-dimensional. The attitude that everything that flies must be controlled by a CINC-level joint forces air component commander (JFACC) will simply not give the flexibility needed in littoral operations."^{m1}

With the ever increasing emphasis on littoral operations, especially in light of the Navy-Marine Corps document "Forward...From the Sea" and the developing Marine Corps and Navy concepts of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), the concept of a littoral component commander has great merit. This same argument can also be applied to other areas and functions such **space** or **information**. The United States is making continual advances in the exploitation of space as a medium useful for surveillance, maneuver, and fires (mostly non-lethal). Would a Joint Force Space Component Commander (JFSCC) be an adjunct mission of the JFACC, or would it be sufficiently heavy in fires, maneuver, and intel/information aspects to warrant a distinct block on a Joint Force wire diagram? Information warfare is already an area to which JFCs have to devote dramatically more attention. Once the realm of the J-2 or J-3, it won't be too long before it becomes a warfare component in and of itself - delivering fires, employing "maneuver" in a cyber-battlespace environment, and providing force protection measures. How will a Joint Force Information Warfare Component Commander (JFIWCC) support the operational commander or relate to the other components within the joint force? How will he exercise control of IW forces and capabilities provided to him for the

accomplishment of his assigned missions? What are possible organization, structure, and billet requirements required by the responsibilities assigned by the JFC? These and related issues should be addressed before such components are found to be needed elements in a real world contingency.

Other aspects to be considered are those brought forth in Joint Vision 2010, CJCS's "conceptual template" for achieving Full Spectrum Dominance in the 21st Century. JV 2010's four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics could well be realized as functions performed by corresponding commanders. In fact, that's just what two of the three wargaming cells did during Global Wargame '97, held this past summer at the Naval War College's Wargaming Center.¹² The cells discovered that, lacking experience with the operational concepts, it was extremely difficult to fight the force using the non-traditional organization. One of the two cells reverted to the traditional J-1 through J-6 structure and functional/Service component forces. The other cell stuck it out and tried to make the unique concept work. Among the difficulties encountered were the problems of task and mission assignment, dissemination of intelligence products to the appropriate operational component and coordination among the components themselves. The wargaming staff reported that while there is no "cookbook" solution in organizing for war, staffs are very comfortable with the more traditional ways of doing things. This familiarity can vary among the different CINC'doms as each has its own way of approaching situations. At present, the JV 2010 approach is very much conceptual and more realistically reflects an idealized view of combat force employment rather than serving as a model upon which to organize a joint force. Still, the lesson

to be learned here is that there are innovative ways to organize and employ forces and such innovative methods should be addressed in joint doctrine if only to make prospective JFCs aware of the possibilities. Again, the relationships among the functional and Service component commanders, requirements for liaison, distribution of responsibilities, the authority required by the various commanders in the execution of their assigned missions, and the synergy expected of their synchronized actions flowing from the JFC's organizational structure need to be addressed in some manner.

I do not think it is realistic to expect a joint doctrine publication to be able to address the myriad issues involved in componency and its relation to operational warfare. I also do not think it is possible to identify and address all of the possible functions a JFC might need to deal with on the battlefield, and whether those functions will simply be subordinate functions of an existing component or worthy of development into a functional component in and of themselves. But, to adequately prepare joint forces and provide the operational JFC a document to which he can refer for guidance, suggestions, and recommendations, a joint publication addressing componency in detail would be of great assistance. A portion of the document dealing with issues common to all components, especially functional components, would provide the JFC something to orient him in organizing his force. Additionally, the Services could use it in training prospective JFCs and the forces to be provided to the combatant commanders.

Componency in Operation

During Operation JUST CAUSE, the joint task force put together to accomplish the assigned mission was organized by subordinate task force, broken out primarily by Service and given

various objectives within the context of the overall operation. With the vast majority of the forces to be used (13,000 troops already in Panama), the Army was given the lead role; LtGen Stiner of the XVIII Airborne Corps designated Commander, JTF South. In developing his OPLAN 90-2, he employed nearly 22,000 Army troops, 3400 Airmen, 900 Marines, and over 700 Sailors. Each was used as a separate task force and assigned missions corresponding to its capabilities. The Air Force provided support to the operation as a whole and special forces (Seals, Rangers, etc.) were grouped under MGen Downing as COMJSOTF.¹³ The operation was marked by simplicity of the operations order, a clear chain of command and superior cooperation among the various Services. This was a direct result of implementation of the reforms outlined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, among which were clear definition of joint force commander authority, consolidation of warfighting powers in the CINCs and simplification of chains of command.¹⁴ Without specifically reporting so, the force planners employed Service components to maximize the capabilities of each while minimizing the coordination problems that arise when forces are mixed. These forces were then separated by distance and mission. A functional component was organized and employed through the consolidation of special operations forces under a single commander.

During Operation DESERT SHIELD, CINCCENT consciously chose to organize his forces primarily along Service component lines while also employing a JFACC due to the anticipated complexity of planned air operations. While using Service components, he also maintained the prerogative to cross attach units as the situation dictated (as he did with the Army's Tiger Brigade attached to MARCENT forces). CINCCENT's use of joint doctrine and the freedom provided by Goldwater-Nichols is superbly illustrated in the next two quotes:

"In establishing the Operation Desert Shield command structure, joint procedures and doctrine provided a basis for integration of US forces. While each Service provided forces to CENTCOM, CINCCENT commanded and decided how to organize them. He organized US forces using both Service components... and a [JFACC] to integrate and coordinate combat power. This structure maintained continuity, ensured component commanders were responsible for Service missions in theater, and smoothed the transition to a wartime organization. SOCCENT remained a sub-unified command, allowing centralized operational control of special operations forces (SOF) from the military Services under a single commander."¹⁵

"In addition, CINCCENT chose to retain the [JFLCC] function rather than delegate the Land Component Command responsibility. CENTCOM's broad, complex mission required unity of effort and the integration of vastly different US and coalition forces. CINCCENT directed the ground service components - ARCENT and MARCENT - and maintained coordination with the Saudi ground force command at his level. However, ARCENT and MARCENT had primary responsibility for developing and analyzing courses of action for their respective ground offensives."¹⁶

Here, a clear understanding of the value of using Service components to maximize the combat capabilities of each while maintaining tactical and operational flexibility and efficiency through the use of functional components such as JFACC and JFSOCC allowed CINCCENT to take advantage of the synergy available through the closely synchronized and coordinated actions of his forces. The result was an extremely effective combined force that overwhelmed Iraqi forces in short order with minimal friendly casualties. Fortunately, CINCCENT had the individual talent, both personal and staff, and presence of mind to organize and fight in such a manner. Again, as our tactics, doctrine, and capabilities have developed since the Gulf War, the need for formal joint doctrine to reflect such experience and lessons learned becomes more essential. US combatant commanders well realize that joint warfare is the American way of war. The operational commanders tasked with organizing and fighting joint force commands need to be able to pull from joint doctrine the *"...distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare...[as it] deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends."*¹⁷

Componency and the CINC

In contrast to the operational organization by Service used during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, CENTCOM today normally operates on functional component lines for planning. In the past, parochial differences among the Services drove the use of Service components. With the emphasis placed on joint operations over the past several years, these differences have faded - from CENTCOM's perspective - and have been replaced by the personal dynamics of individual commanders. According to CENTCOM J-3 personnel, no additional doctrinal guidance is needed as the skills and personal experiences of the individual commander make for good coordination and use of force capabilities.¹⁸ My argument with this lies with the fact that forces provided to CENTCOM come from several different locations and Services with the training of these forces occurring prior to their arrival in theater. Subordinate commanders and forces need to be trained from a common starting point in order to ensure disparities have been minimized and forces are able to be task-organized with as little difficulty as possible.

In contrast to CENTCOM's position, the US Atlantic Command would very much like to see additional guidance provided in joint doctrine. This is do in large measure, no doubt, to the additional task assigned to ACOM of training prospective JFCs. On October 1, 1993, USACOM was designated the Joint Force Integrator.¹⁹ With this designation came the task of providing forces to supported combatant commanders. A Joint Training Directorate (J-7) was established "...responsible for the teaching and improvement of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures [TTP] to this audience, and the assessment of component forces' performance in joint exercises and operations."²⁰ Where joint doctrine is found to be inadequate or nonexistent,

ACOM has the job of developing TTPs to be used until incorporated into formal joint doctrine. The most common vehicle for training prospective JFCs has been the Unified Endeavor series of exercises, utilizing a series of phased instruction leading to a culminating joint exercise. Their experience has been that while the Services are usually very accepting of a joint perspective, differences in Service doctrine and the inherent effectiveness in employing Service-integrated forces usually result in the default option of organizing with Service Component Commanders. The lack of specific componency guidance in joint doctrine results in these Service Component Commanders having little idea of their duties during the initial phases of training.²¹ This is further compounded when the Service Component Commander is dual hatted as a Functional Component Commander and has to plan for the employment of not only his own Service force but also develop plans integrating the efforts of other Services within a common medium or toward a common end. In the words of one operations officer "Anything joint doctrine can do to outline areas of concern [for the commander] should be done."²²

Componency and the Service

Among the Services themselves, opinions vary as to the need for expanded treatment of componency. In AFDD-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, the position and role of COMAFFOR is briefly mentioned as is his assignment as JFACC, if so designated by the JFC. As for the COMAFFOR's Service component "responsibilities, authorities, and command relationships", it is simply stated that they will be "as directed through the operational and administrative chains of command."²³ No other discussion is presented concerning the potential use and responsibilities of Air Force commanders as functional component commanders within a joint force although a much more detailed treatment of JFACC is given in Joint Pub 3-56.1.

The Army and Marine Corps have spent quite a bit of time and effort wrestling with the concept of JFLCC. In fact, the assistance of the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSAC) was sought in this effort and ALSAC produced a thorough study in April 1997. The study concluded, in part, that the role of JFLCC is viable and is being practiced to a limited degree; current joint doctrine does not provide enough guidance to execute the option; JFLCC hasn't been employed enough to develop meaningful TTP; and that expanded guidance in Joint Pubs 3-56 and 5-00.2 would help.²⁴

The Army's Strategy, Plans and Doctrine Division agrees that a publication on componentcy is needed but that a general "hue and cry" for such an item has not been raised by field units.²⁵ Field Manual 100-5, Operations, does discuss the responsibilities of the Army Service Component Commander and briefly mentions JFLCC as an option. It favors the use of a Service component arrangement, citing the advantage of straightforward support relationships between the parent Service and combatant command structure.²⁶ Likewise, the Marine Corps agrees that more clarity is needed on the subject but that the additional information should be in Joint Pub 3-0. The Marine Corps also reported that in training their prospective JFC staffs, the most difficult class given is on *organization of the force*. Lacking joint doctrine, Marine Corps force providers have to rely on in-house training while adjusting to the differing requirements of multiple CINCs.²⁷ A study was commissioned by the Marine Corps to look into joint doctrine as it addresses Service Component Headquarters. In performing the study, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) reviewed applicable doctrine and drew some definite conclusions. Of particular interest was the observation that while service component commands have been the norm, this was primarily due to tradition; while current practices are leaning toward functional componentcy.²⁸ Both the Army

and Marine Corps cited Joint Pub 3-56.1 as a good example of what doctrine should provide in terms of guidance for the operational commander.

Componency - Getting From Here to There

The difficulty in developing joint doctrine lies in achieving a common understanding among the different Services. Approved joint doctrine is the result of a maturation process reflecting a period of time sufficiently long enough for new concepts to be hashed out, exercised, refined and finally accepted with a relatively high degree of comfort by the Services affected. Joint doctrine on JFACC reflects this process while the absence of doctrine on JFLCC and JFMCC reflect the immaturity of these concepts. A concentrated effort over a period of time will be required to reach consensus on even these familiar functions²⁹ - not to mention the possible functions, such as JFSCC and JFIWCC, I discussed above. In contrast to the opinions of ALSAC, the Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) opines that additional guidance is not required. A gap in joint doctrine doesn't necessarily mean that something is required to fill it. A validated requirement for additional doctrine on componency has yet to be forwarded for consideration.³⁰ JWC did concur with the difficulty in producing new doctrine when the individual Services have yet to fully agree on the issue.

Draft publications are in no way authoritative as they have not yet been approved as doctrinal materials. They are works-in-progress and in all probability will change dramatically from revision to revision. That being said, there are three in draft form that deal with componency in some form or fashion: Draft Joint Pub 3-56, Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations; Draft Joint Pub 5-00.1, JTTP for Joint Campaign Planning; and Draft Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task

Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. Draft Joint Pub 3-56 emphasizes the importance of unit integrity, urging the employment of Service forces as integral units due to their inherent training, capabilities, cohesion and effectiveness. The document does expand somewhat on Service components, specifically addressing component commander responsibilities in broad terms. It also very briefly addresses JFACC, JFLCC, and JFMCC organizations. Draft Joint Pub 5-00.1 takes a couple of pages to discuss the development of supporting plans by Service and functional component commanders. Draft Joint Pub 5-00.2 mentions Service component commands, spends more time reiterating some discussion of functional component commander responsibilities and at last revision, incorporated brief comments on considerations for the employment of JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC options.

Reflecting the critical nature of force organization in command and control, Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, does a thorough job of discussing JFACC. It goes to great length in listing JFACC responsibilities, the JFACC's authority and command relationships, requirements for component liaison, JFACC staff organization, assignments, considerations for transition, planning considerations for Joint Air Operations, and targeting/tasking requirements in a Joint Air Operations environment. Following success in Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM and the continuing operational experience of 5 ATAF as the JFACC coordinating Operation DENY FLIGHT over Bosnia, JFACC has certainly become the best known and most studied of the functional components. This level of effort needs to be continued with the other common functional components. It also needs to be extended into a more thorough understanding of functional componentcy as a concept, so that when other

functional areas are identified, based on unique situations, the basic requirements for component organization and staffing, liaison, command relationships, authority over applicable forces, and responsibilities of the functional component commander to the operational commander are understood. The operational commander needs to have a good foundation to work from to speed the organization of his forces along the most effective lines.

Conclusion

To briefly restate the primary conclusions I have drawn in this study: 1) a comprehensive treatment of componency is lacking in joint doctrine; 2) JFCs would be greatly assisted in force organization by a joint doctrine publication that addresses componency in detail; 3) guidance on the formation and use of functional components, specifically, should be expanded to address innovative force employment and emerging warfare concepts; and 4) such doctrine should capture the "insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience" - in other words, lessons learned.

This can be accomplished by compiling a single publication that thoroughly discusses componency doctrine. Discussing various components in separate, distinct volumes would not only invite parochialism on the part of the respective lead service but would also dispense with a consolidated forum for discussion of common componency issues and exploration of potential functional component organizations. A single publication, possibly titled *Joint Force Organization*, would reinforce the joint aspect of the issue and provide a natural flow in the thought process of organizing a joint force. It would also serve as a single source reference for operational commanders, Service force providers, and joint force trainers. *Joint Force Organization* would begin with discussion of the authority to organize joint forces flowing from codified regulations,

directives, and law. Next, general definitions of Service and Functional components and associated common issues would be discussed. The most commonly used functional components - JFLCC, JFACC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC - should be discussed within their own chapters with attention paid to recommendations for organization, staffing, responsibilities, planning roles, and force employment functions. *Joint Force Organization* should finish with the possibilities of other functional components, their effect on maximizing the employment of joint force capabilities, and the environment and conditions that would lead an operational commander to utilize such options.

Just as a senior commander is responsible for supporting the forces he employs, so too is joint doctrine responsible for providing support to the commander who looks to it for guidance. The organization of forces being of critical importance in the successful conduct of operations, it is essential that joint doctrine address the matter in detail. It is only by educating and training Joint Force Commanders in peacetime that we will ensure talented and capable forces are ready for times of war. A joint publication on componency is needed now and should be pursued immediately to better support operational commanders tasked with organizing and employing joint forces in the complex battle environments of today and the future.

NOTES

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University, 1989) p. 579

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (Joint Pub 1) (Washington, D.C.: 10 January 1995), p. i

³ *ibid*

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Joint Pub 0-2) (Washington, D.C.: 24 February 1995) p. xiv

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1995)

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) (Washington, D.C.: 23 March 1994)

⁷ Joint Pub 0-2, pp. IV-16, 17

⁸ Joint Pub 1-02

⁹ Joint Pub 0-2, p. IV-18

¹⁰ *ibid*, p. IV-3

¹¹ Gary W. Anderson and Terry C. Pierce, "Leaving the Technocratic Tunnel," Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 1995-1996) p. 74

¹² Cdr Mike Perry, Wargaming Dept, Naval War College, interview by author, 16 Jan 98, Simms Hall, Newport, R.I.

¹³ Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause - The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988-January 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 1995)

¹⁴ Lyle M. Koenig, Strategy in Operation Just Cause: A Framework for Analysis (Air War College: Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 1994)

¹⁵ Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: April, 1992) p. 546

¹⁶ *ibid*, pp. 547-8

¹⁷ Joint Pub 1, p. vi

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¹⁸Maj Brian Beaudreault, US Central Command, J-3 Plans, telephone conversation with author, 15 Dec 97.

¹⁹SECDEF, US Atlantic Command (USACOM) Implementation Plan, (Washington: 1 Oct 1993)

²⁰ibid, p. B-3-H-1

²¹Maj Mark Smith, J-7, U.S. Atlantic Command, telephone conversation with author, 18 Dec 97.

²²Col Davis, J-3 (Current Operations), USACOM, telephone conversation with author, 18 Dec 97.

²³ibid

²⁴ALSAC, Joint Forces Land Component Commander Study (April 1997) p. 15

²⁵Gary Bunds, Strategy Plans and Doctrine Division, Headquarters US Army, telephone conversation with author, 8 Jan 98.

²⁶Department of the Army, Operations (FM 100-5) (Washington, D.C.: June 1993)

²⁷LtCol John Allison, MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) Branch, MCCDC, telephone conversation with author, 16 Jan 98.

²⁸Jonathan T. Dworken, Joint Doctrine on Service Component Headquarters (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, VA Feb 1994)

²⁹Col Williams, Director, ALSAC, telephone conversation with author, 8 Jan 98.

³⁰Col Bob Rodell, Joint Warfighting Center, telephone conversation with author, 14 Jan 98.

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